My Involvement with National Security Work in China: A Personal Account
Due to a twist of fate, I was approached by China’s National Security Bureau and spent a few years working as a peripheral operative, akin to a "white glove" role, engaging in minor business collaborations. Here’s what I learned based on my experience:
1. Structure and Funding Challenges of the National Security System
The National Security Bureau and General Staff Department operate in various divisions. For example:
Division One: Handles foreign intelligence.
Division Two: Focuses on internal matters, including generating funds due to reduced state financial support since around 2020.
During my involvement with Division Two, their primary focus was on raising funds to cover costs such as compensations for operatives injured or killed abroad, securing the release of detained personnel, and rebuilding dismantled operations. These efforts required significant funding, often measured in billions of yuan, for establishing new outposts. Returning operatives who retired from the field would receive substantial payouts as “retirement” or “hush” money.
2. Income Generation Methods
Based on my observations, Division Two engages in industries like oil, sugar, and minerals. My involvement began with sugar, facilitated through connections with CIC Digital Resources (Hong Kong)—a subsidiary of China Investment Corporation (CIC). During this process, I connected with a buyer from Hainan who had reservations about using U.S. banks due to potential fund freezes. The buyer’s business appeared linked to Belt and Road projects targeting the Middle East.
The situation became complicated due to internal power struggles within CIC. Retired senior leaders had conflicts with newly appointed executives, leading to accusations of fraud against CIC Digital. This turmoil led to disruptions, as I witnessed firsthand when deals collapsed and buyers accused us of being scammers. Eventually, CIC’s internal issues were resolved through intervention from higher authorities.
3. Connections to High-Profile Spy Cases
I became indirectly involved in a case linked to MI6’s Huang, who briefly served as a Division Two director in Yunnan before being arrested for espionage. During his tenure, he oversaw large-scale internal audits of the National Security Bureau, prompted by database breaches in Guizhou. These audits uncovered several irregularities within the system.
4. Background and Entry into Sugar Trading
I am a former military officer (who graduated from CLASSIFIED College) who left due to limited advancement opportunities. After leaving the army in 2011, I entered the telecommunications industry, leveraging family connections within major carriers.
I later became involved in sugar trading through a former military colleague who had risen to a leadership position in Division Two. Faced with funding shortages, his team sought to capitalize on my local connections in Yunnan. I chose sugar over other options like copper and oil, as it was more manageable within my network.
5. Challenges and Setbacks in the Sugar Business
Several obstacles emerged during my involvement:
Ministry of Commerce Issues: Attempts to secure sugar quotas were derailed by bureaucratic delays and leadership inaction, including approvals that reportedly required Xi Jinping’s signature.
Supply and Marketing Cooperatives: Negotiations with cooperatives often stalled due to demands for bribes and legal complications, resulting in key documents being sealed after high-profile arrests.
Internal Power Struggles: CIC executives engaged in public disputes, undermining trust in legitimate business operations.
Banking Constraints: Buyers refused to use U.S.-based banks, citing fears of frozen accounts. This required extensive renegotiations and alternative arrangements.
6. Broader Implications
These experiences shed light on the challenges faced by China’s national security apparatus as it seeks to maintain operations amidst funding constraints and internal discord. Relying on business ventures to generate funds has created vulnerabilities, exposing the system to corruption, inefficiency, and external scrutiny.