【EXCLUSIVE】Intelligence Report: How an Individual with Documented CCP Loyalty and Academic Influence Operations Entered U.S. Electoral Politics
- Liberty Network
- 11 minutes ago
- 26 min read
Executive Summary
In 2025, a Chinese student named Xinlin (Sherry) Chen joined the campaign team of Curtis Sliwa, a Republican candidate for New York City Mayor. This political engagement represents the latest phase in a documented influence operation that has seen Chen systematically penetrate elite U.S. academic institutions while explicitly serving Chinese Communist Party strategic objectives. Her trajectory from self-described "foreign exchange battlefield" operator at Johns Hopkins and Columbia to active participant in U.S. electoral politics—all while maintaining documented financial ties to Chinese institutions and unwavering commitment to "expanding China's discourse power"—raises profound national security concerns.
This report is based entirely on Chen's own extensive written accounts published on her WeChat Public Account under "馨琳日记" (Xinlin Diary), where she has documented her strategies, objectives, and methods with extraordinary transparency. Her own words reveal not merely academic networking but a sophisticated influence campaign that she explicitly frames using CCP United Front terminology, operates according to stated principles that prohibit honest discourse about China, and pursues long-term objectives including her stated ambition to become U.S. Secretary of Defense.
What makes this case particularly significant is not merely the activities themselves, but Chen's remarkable documentation of them. She has published detailed accounts of her cultivation targets, her strategic rationale, her operational principles, and her ultimate objectives—providing unprecedented insight into how CCP-aligned influence operations function within American institutions. Her progression from campus influence operations to direct participation in U.S. electoral politics demonstrates the potential trajectory of such operations when left unchecked.
From Academic "Battlefield" to Electoral Politics
Chen's involvement in the Sliwa mayoral campaign must be understood in the context of her documented activities over the preceding years. This is not a case of an ordinary student becoming politically engaged, but rather an individual who has explicitly stated her mission to advance CCP interests now seeking to influence American electoral outcomes and position herself within U.S. political structures.
Her own published statements reveal the strategic logic: having successfully penetrated academic institutions, cultivated networks of professors and policy experts, and gained platform access at elite venues, she is now translating that foundation into direct political engagement. Her stated ambition to become U.S. Secretary of Defense, combined with her recent joining of the Republican Party, suggests a long-term strategy of political positioning while maintaining the loyalties and objectives she has so clearly documented.
Subject Profile
Name: Xinlin (Sherry) Chen
Affiliation: Columbia University/Sciences Po Paris (dual degree)
Stated Role: Research Associate, South China Sea NewsWire
Political Activity: Campaign team member, Curtis Sliwa for NYC Mayor 2025
Platform: WeChat Public Account "馨琳日记" with documented readership in the hundreds
Political Affiliation: Recently joined Republican Party
Mission Statement: In Her Own Words
Chen has articulated her objectives with remarkable clarity. Under the heading "Using Practical Actions to Expand Chinese Discourse Power," she writes:
"With my continuous high-intensity output on LinkedIn, some expert scholars actively send emails or write on LinkedIn following my connect, including scholars from various countries, policy experts, entrepreneurs, etc. This is not only a confirmation of my personal high-frequency expression, but also a strong endorsement of 'China's soft power in Central Asia'."
She describes her ultimate goal in explicit terms:
"My Hope in Using Practical Actions to Practice: Expand China's International Discourse Power, Build a Global Cross-Border Influence Network."
Her assessment of China's strategic position reveals the CCP framework she operates within:
"This time history has given me a deeper awareness that although China's economic strength has long been prominent, discourse power in international public opinion is still far from sufficient. In the long run, Chinese people have been accustomed to 'loudly issuing great wealth'. In wealth accumulation, we have achieved huge success, but in international public opinion, political power, cultural communication and other fields, Chinese discourse power is still not sufficiently influential."
She explicitly positions this as learning from others who "not only control wealth, but more occupy the dominant position in the global discourse system," concluding that "Chinese people need to improve strategy, not only need wealth, but more need discourse power."
This mission statement provides critical context for understanding her subsequent involvement in U.S. electoral politics. She is not simply a student exploring political engagement, but someone operating according to explicitly articulated strategic objectives regarding Chinese discourse power.
Operational Principles: The CCP Loyalty Test
Chen has published explicit guidelines that govern her public engagement, revealing a commitment to propaganda over truth:
"My stance is very clear, and I can also understand and accommodate people with different positions. As a Chinese person, my principles are:
When discussing China in international public forums, focus on guiding everyone to pay attention to China and the Communist Party's strengths and achievements.
Do not speak negatively about China in front of foreigners."
These are not casual statements but declared operational principles that guide all her public activities in the United States—including, presumably, her current work on a U.S. political campaign. The implications are stark: an individual working on an American electoral campaign operates under self-imposed restrictions against making any statements that she deems "unprofitable" for China and the CCP.
This raises fundamental questions about her role in the campaign: Can someone committed to never making "unprofitable speeches about China" provide honest counsel on U.S.-China policy? Can someone whose stated principle is to always "focus on guiding everyone to pay attention to China and the Communist Party's strengths and achievements" be trusted to prioritize American interests?
Ideological Statements: Praising Dictatorship and Denying Oppression
Support for One-Party Rule
Chen explicitly advocates for authoritarian governance over democracy:
"One-party dictatorship is profitable and efficient. For example, China's major infrastructure projects are completed very efficiently: high-speed rail, etc. The two-party dictatorship in the United States often leads to many policies that cannot be implemented for long periods, and tax money is invested in the two parties fighting each other, rather than being fully used to improve people's lives."
She acknowledges corruption as a drawback but quickly dismisses it: "Of course, one-party dictatorship also has some drawbacks, such as corruption. In fact, our national leaders have been cracking down on corruption and have already achieved strict strikes. The current anti-corruption storm has already blown away the wind."
Her characterization of the U.S. system as "two-party dictatorship" reveals fundamental hostility to American democratic institutions—the very institutions she now seeks to influence through campaign involvement.
Gratitude to CCP and Denial of Political Oppression
In a revealing passage, Chen expresses her loyalty to the regime:
"As a Chinese citizen born and raised in China, I have never been afraid of our government. I am grateful to the CCP government for leading us to prosperity, strength, and security, and guiding us onto the world stage. I have the freedom to go anywhere I want, access information from various channels, and communicate with people from different countries. Without the leadership of the CCP government, we might not even have enough food to eat today."
She describes CCP control over speech as reasonable:
"The CCP has done so much for us, and its only request is that we do not make statements on public platforms that are detrimental to the country and the Party---this is perfectly reasonable. Not badmouthing one's own country in public is something every dignified and principled citizen would naturally do. Besides, I don't want to criticize the government because it has done an excellent job; there's nothing worth complaining about."
In another version of similar statements, she writes:
"Because China produces most of the public goods in the world, I don't want to be afraid of our government. I am very grateful that the Chinese Communist Party has led us to prosperity and strength, leading us toward world peace. I have the freedom to go anywhere I want, to acquire all kinds of information without censorship, and to interact with people from different countries. If there were no leadership from the Chinese Communist Party, we might now be eating nothing but potatoes."
She acknowledges her privilege while claiming equality: "Of course, I also realize that I have some privilege, so my views and feelings do not represent all Chinese people. Not to mention how, although not everyone has the same opportunities, wealth, vision, but every Chinese person is equal."
These statements reveal an individual who has internalized or strategically adopted CCP propaganda narratives in their entirety. Her claim to have access to information "without censorship" contradicts documented reality of China's Great Firewall and internet controls. Her assertion that every Chinese person is equal directly contradicts the reality of China's social credit system, hukou household registration restrictions, and systematic discrimination.
Denial of Ethnic Cleansing in China
Under a section discussing a Palestinian student's arrest at Johns Hopkins, Chen denies CCP ethnic oppression while attacking US. history:
"because the United States has always relied on slave-building the country, so even now there are still racial prejudices. There are 56 ethnic groups in China, and no mutual ethnic prejudices from the start, with fewer ethnic minorities always receiving very good protections."
This statement directly contradicts documented evidence of CCP treatment of Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other minorities, revealing her role in spreading disinformation. An individual who denies ethnic cleansing while praising authoritarian rule now works on an American political campaign—raising questions about what other narratives she might promote in that context.
Infiltration Tactics: Direct Institutional Confrontation
Demanding Platform Access
In an article titled "Live from the SIPA office: Demanding to join the China perspective," Chen describes her confrontational approach:
"This morning, I walked into the SIPA president's office and found several activity organizers, directly asking:
'Please, why is this 'Beijing+30' conference not inviting any Chinese experts at all?'
They looked at each other, then someone replied:
'We did conduct a trial on inviting Chinese experts, but because of the subsequent questions, they ultimately couldn't come.'
This type of 'subsequent questions' excuse, I have heard too many. If they really have enough respect for Chinese voices, why not have any replacement plan?
Thus, I did not back down, but directly stated:
'If Chinese experts cannot come, then I will come.'"
She then describes her pitch:
"Looking at the organizer teacher, I said firmly:
'I can contribute to this conference. I myself am Chinese, and have deep research on U.S.-Europe learning political economy. I have extensive knowledge of Sino-U.S. relations, global women's leadership power, and the historical influence of the 1995 World Conference. I can provide a unique perspective on China.'"
Another article carries the bold title: "I am fighting for Chinese discourse power at Johns Hopkins SAIS, negotiating with Hillary's aide," demonstrating her success in reaching the highest institutional levels.
The tactics she used to gain platform access at academic institutions—direct confrontation, demands framed as diversity advocacy, and leveraging institutional sensitivities—may now be applied in political contexts. Her documented success in these institutional penetration efforts suggests similar approaches could be effective in campaign settings.
Stated Goal for Campus Influence
Under "My Wishes, Goals and Actions," she writes:
"My Wish: Promote campus consciousness morphology diversification
In Western academic systems, global governance, gender issues, international politics and other topics often dominated by Western perspectives. I hope to promote more diverse academic discussions, ensuring Chinese voices are heard."
This framing of "diversity" serves as cover for advancing CCP-approved narratives while suppressing dissenting Chinese voices. The same framing could be deployed in political contexts, where calls for including "Chinese perspectives" might mask efforts to advance CCP interests.
Network Cultivation: Intelligence Gathering and Targeted Engagement
Pre-Event Research and Tailored Outreach
Chen describes her preparation methodology in detail:
"My Preparation: One-Handed, Accurate Layout
Before the conference two days ago, I spent a few hours researching 16 keynote speakers' backgrounds, achievements, research fields, core viewpoints and connection methods. Then gradually sent out emails one by one---not styled as a template, but tailored content for each person. I discussed their research fields, responded to their paper points, and combined my own background and perspective, expressed in soft tone and shared:
Someone researched India-U.S. trade, and I wrote about the strategic balance between China and the U.S. in South Asia;
Someone researched ethnic minority religiousism, and I shared my views on how the Chinese and Vietnamese political systems treat the 'China-Vietnam' rights comparison research;
Someone researched the ocean development policy in Asia, and I invited him: different countries developing ocean infrastructure, should international social reactions be different.
...
Among the 10 keynote speakers who replied to me before the conference, 7 were '秒回' (instant reply): including the one who established the Hehe Association and Ho Chi Minh City International Research Center's executive director, Vietnam's former National Assembly member, Johns Hopkins new colleague...
Some professors even offered to help me revise my core thesis before submission, letting me 'think bigger on these issues'."
This reveals a sophisticated intelligence-gathering and cultivation operation, with her targets including former government officials and international organization leaders. The same methodologies—detailed research on targets, tailored approaches, strategic relationship building—are directly applicable to political campaign contexts, where understanding donor networks, policy influencers, and political stakeholders is valuable.
Six-Week Cultivation Protocol
Chen documents a systematic approach to cultivating specific targets. Under a section titled "Actions," she provides a week-by-week breakdown:
This phased approach demonstrates operational discipline characteristic of trained influence operations, not casual networking. The six-week cultivation protocol she employed in academic settings could be adapted for political contexts—cultivating donors, activists, policy advisors, or other campaign stakeholders using similar methodical approaches.
Results: High-Level Network Penetration
Chen describes the outcomes of her sustained efforts:
"For example, after the last 'China's Soft Power in Central Asia' passionate speech, I immediately held a meeting and sent reflective posts with information density, emotional concentration high, full of sincerity and literary sense, which attracted the attention of Central Asian experts. Even some senior UN officials and think tank foreign ministry personnel took the initiative to contact me online. There are also U.S. and European think tank scholars telling me a lot about their countries' students coming to China to study."
She summarizes her achievement:
"In summary, I have seen in front of Central Asian scholars a kind and approachable Chinese image, with the posture of a major country, strong common development, and peaceful discourse. These Asian small countries' representatives, originally just against China's influence has a sense of vigilance, after I so approachable, they even took the initiative to start contacting me, and some research non-Asian scholars also began to contact me, and even some began to contact me for China-Asia influence."
Her success in cultivating senior UN officials, think tank personnel, and policy scholars demonstrates capabilities that translate directly to political campaign contexts, where relationship networks are currency.
Strategic Deception: Dual Messaging
Public Statements vs. Internal Objectives
Chen reveals her deceptive approach in conversations with academics. She describes an interaction with a senior professor:
"A senior professor asked me: 'Have you ever thought of becoming a politician? Are you in China or still in the United States?'
I said: 'Regardless of any representative, I am more happy in different political systems to compare, understand, and interpret. I hope to contribute to the motherland, and also participate in international dialogue. I write articles in the Chinese database, focusing on international education and time-political analysis; I study economics and political science at Johns Hopkins.'
He then asked: 'Then how do you view Sino-U.S. relations?'
I answered: 'I think Professor Keohane's viewpoint supports competition and cooperation in a strategy-type competition, rather than adopting a binary oppositional thinking, choosing one side to stand with. In the competition of strategy-type, information is the key to victory. In academic circles, adding different perspectives can grasp more information.' (Although my inner hope is that more Chinese perspectives are heard, more understood, but I know that in international dialogue, the demand is for exchange thinking and common interests language.)"
The parenthetical revelation exposes her strategy: publicly advocating balanced dialogue while internally pursuing maximization of Chinese influence. She tells audiences what they want to hear about cooperation and diverse perspectives while harboring different objectives.
This dual-messaging capability is particularly concerning in a political campaign context. Chen has demonstrated ability to present positions that appeal to her audience while maintaining entirely different internal objectives. In a campaign setting, this could mean presenting policy positions that appeal to voters or donors while actually serving different strategic interests.
Weaponized Femininity: Appearance as Strategic Tool
Calculated Visual Presentation
Chen explicitly describes using her appearance and clothing as weapons in what she calls her "foreign exchange strategy." Under a section titled "My Appearance: Soft but Feminine," she writes:
"I wore a classic 'classic styling' from my own: Johns Hopkins University tight short-sleeve top, navy blue half-length pleated skirt, wearing white butterfly knot earrings. Bright, but not ostentatious; repaired, yet also media-friendly; random, but very elegant.
In this occasion, I almost cleared a deep color suit. And I, is the only one wearing bright long skirt, head butterfly knot, no '刻意职业化' person. But I did not flinch, but became the visual center.
Because my appearance recognition is extremely high, it makes me more calm in the whole process, speak not rushed, and cannot be ignored."
Strategic Wardrobe Decisions
She provides detailed rationale for her choices:
"This time I brought LV bag, is out of the venue's accurate identification: last time is pure academic meeting, should '低调'; this time is commercial institute fee peak meeting, pay attention to '进取'.
Every '穿搭', are my foreign exchange strategy part. Because for me, women can use different language to describe themselves, including: words power, action logic, and beauty visual expression."
This calculated use of appearance to manipulate perception and ensure she "cannot be ignored" represents a sophisticated understanding of psychological influence tactics. In political campaign contexts, where image and presentation are crucial, such calculated approach to visual presentation could be particularly effective for influence purposes.
Strategic Differentiation
In another article discussing her "Upgrade Strategy," she elaborates:
"Strategy Keywords: Accurate Approach + Active Response + Visualized Expression
Accurately contact keynote speakers, while non-visual same group send email.
On-site actively speak, guest video, while waiting for uncertain occurrence of 'official video' section.
Wear bright short-sleeve + navy pleated skirt + white butterfly knot, create visual narrative, different people have different interpretations.
This time I brought LV bag, is out of the venue's accurate identification: last time is pure academic meeting, should '低调'; this time is commercial institute fee peak meeting, pay attention to '进取'."
The deliberate creation of "visual narrative" as part of influence strategy reveals operational sophistication beyond typical academic or political networking. Her explicit framing of clothing choices and appearance as strategic tools demonstrates conscious manipulation of perception.
Military Terminology: The "Battlefield" Framework
United Front Language
Chen repeatedly uses military and combat terminology that aligns with CCP United Front Work Department framing. In an article titled "Johns Hopkins University China Summit: My Foreign Exchange Battlefield," she writes:
"1. Fight for the Gate Before: Clear Goal, Challenge Allies
When I passed by the Johns Hopkins University glass rotating door, not only walked into a lecture hall, but walked into my foreign exchange battlefield."
The term "battlefield" (战场) is standard United Front terminology for describing influence operations in foreign countries. Her casual use of this framing reveals either training in or deep familiarity with CCP influence work concepts. The application of battlefield terminology to academic conferences suggests she may view her political campaign involvement through similar lens—as another theater in a broader strategic campaign.
"Social Warfare Strategy"
Another article is explicitly titled: "Chinese female student uses social warfare strategy to influence U.S. core academic circle" (中国女留学生用社交战术影响美国核心学术圈).
She describes her approach:
"My Strategy: Soft but Rigid, Quiet Layout
This time on the 'Te Ming Pu second phase on Southeast Asia influence' discussion meeting, the Brookings Institution did not invite any Chinese experts to speak.
However, every keynote speaker, are two sentences without leaving China.
I, a Chinese mainland female student from a big country, decided to let the world see China.
My Goal Very Clear: To be among the top 40 keynote speakers, accurately lock me as the most valuable link four experts, and through strategy intercourse with thought exchange, establish sustainable development ties. With this same time, publicly show my academic ability and foreign exchange ability, create a unique words style with international influence."
The use of "warfare strategy" (战术) and "soft but rigid" (柔中带刚) reflects CCP strategic thinking about influence operations combining soft power with hard objectives. Her framing of influence work as warfare is particularly concerning now that she has transitioned from academic to explicitly political contexts.
Case Study: Brookings Institution Penetration
Chen provides a detailed account of her operation at a Brookings Institution event, revealing her methodology:
"Title: Chinese female student uses social warfare strategy to influence U.S. core academic circle
Caption Below Photo: I and researchers from the U.S., Southeast Asia countries, policy experts, international organization responsible persons...
My Strategy: Soft but Rigid, Quiet Layout
This time on the 'Te Ming Pu second phase on Southeast Asia influence' discussion meeting, the Brookings Institution did not invite any Chinese experts to speak.
However, every keynote speaker, are two sentences without leaving China.
I, a Chinese mainland female student from a big country, decided to let the world see China."
She describes her strategic evolution:
"1. Upgrade Strategy: Accurate Strike, Active Layout
This time the scene is different from my previous participation in the 'Te Ming Pu on Southeast Asia national influence' academic meeting.
Last time, I adopted '沉默认水', is '被' experts approach, '被' pulled into Group C. This meeting and the next are different------scale larger, more people, more venues, more uncontrollable factors. Therefore, I swapped a set of strategies."
Her assessment of her previous passive approach versus new active strategy demonstrates learning and adaptation in influence operations. The Brookings Institution case study is particularly relevant to her political campaign involvement because it demonstrates her capability to penetrate prestigious American institutions and adapt strategies based on context.
Propaganda Activities: Attacking U.S. Government
Political Purge Allegations
In an article titled "Pro-Palestine student captured; special statement playing 'freedom of speech' double standard, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Management Building fourth-floor hymn," Chen attacks U.S. immigration enforcement:
"On the evening of March 9, ICE (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) suddenly arrested a student dorm resident at Johns Hopkins University, capturing Palestinian activist and SIPA 2024-level student Mahmoud Khalil. The official reason is that the U.S. State Department revoked his student visa---however, he apparently does not need a visa, because he is a green card holder.
So, this is not immigration enforcement, but political purge."
This framing of law enforcement as "political purge" echoes CCP propaganda narratives about U.S. authoritarianism. Her willingness to publish inflammatory accusations against U.S. government agencies raises questions about what messaging she might promote through political campaign channels.
Classroom Propaganda
Chen describes using her classroom platform for propaganda:
"At the Johns Hopkins University School of International Studies undergraduate international politics class, I lectured to classmates on U.S. hegemony and the rise of China."
The article is dated September 21, 2024, and sourced from "陈馨琳 馨琳日记" (Chen Xinlin, Xinlin Diary), indicating she documented this classroom propaganda activity on her public WeChat account. Her characterization of teaching as "lecturing classmates on U.S. hegemony and the rise of China" reveals how she views her role—not as student engaging in discussion, but as propagandist delivering messaging.
Cultivating Sympathetic Voices
The Japanese Professor Case
Chen documents her cultivation of academics who support CCP positions. In an article titled "'Japan should side with China in confrontation, not continue to be America's lapdog' --- A Japanese professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS bluntly tells me," she writes:
"Today, I had an in-depth conversation with a Japanese professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS.
She has studied China for over ten years, has traveled on China's high-speed rail, the 'Belt and Road,' and has a lot of system analysis on Sino-U.S. relations. On campus, she speaks coldly and rationally, and many Western scholars on site even applauded her views."
This article, dated April 5, 2025, and marked as "Starred" by 453 people on her WeChat account, demonstrates her documentation of successfully identifying and cultivating academics sympathetic to CCP positions.
The title's quote about Japan being "America's lapdog" reveals the type of anti-U.S. messaging she promotes through her network while publicly claiming to support balanced dialogue. Her ability to identify and cultivate sympathetic voices in academic settings could translate to political contexts, where identifying sympathetic donors, activists, or policy advisors would be valuable.
Financial Structure: Institutional Compensation
Chen's biographical materials state:
"Several Chinese institutions have invited her to contribute research papers on politics, economics, and education, each compensated at a professional rate. In addition, she writes regularly on her WeChat Public Account, which maintains a strong readership base and features sponsored content and business collaborations."
This creates a financial incentive structure aligned with Chinese institutional interests while she operates within U.S. academic settings and now political contexts. The compensation for research papers on politics from Chinese institutions while conducting influence operations in the U.S. raises serious questions about undisclosed foreign agent activity.
Her involvement in a U.S. political campaign while maintaining financial relationships with Chinese institutions that compensate her for political research creates obvious conflicts of interest and potential Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) violations. Is she disclosing these financial relationships to the campaign? Are campaign officials aware they have someone on their team who receives compensation from Chinese institutions for political work?
Long-Term Political Infiltration: Secretary of Defense Ambitions
Perhaps most alarming are Chen's documented ambitions to penetrate the highest levels of U.S. national security apparatus. She has published statements about joining the Republican Party and aspiring to become U.S. Secretary of Defense.
In a poetic declaration, she writes:
"🇺🇸 In the future, the U.S. Secretary of Defense will pledge allegiance on Independence Day:
Like a mother protecting her child, he guards the United States,
Taking the name of 'We the People' as his lifelong duty and mission”.
This represents an extraordinary situation: an individual who has explicitly documented her mission to "expand China's international discourse power," praised one-party dictatorship as "profitable and efficient," denied CCP ethnic cleansing, stated principles of never making "unprofitable speeches about China in front of foreigners," and described academic conferences as her "foreign exchange battlefield," now expresses intentions to serve as U.S. Secretary of Defense.
Her involvement in the Sliwa campaign must be understood as part of this long-term trajectory. She is not simply volunteering for a local campaign out of civic interest—she is positioning herself within Republican Party structures as part of explicitly articulated ambitions to reach the highest levels of U.S. national security leadership.
The phrase "equip myself with fellow comrades" is particularly revealing, suggesting coordination with others in long-term positioning within U.S. institutions. The word "comrades" (同志) carries specific political connotations in Chinese political discourse, typically referring to CCP party members or political allies.
Messaging Strategy: The Diplomatic Cover
Chen articulates her public messaging approach under a main title that serves as diplomatic cover:
"Main Title:
As China Rises, She Uplifts Her Neighbours
Not through Dominance or Deterrence ---
But through Dialogue, Development, Dignity."
This messaging of China as benevolent partner directly contradicts CCP actions in the South China Sea, toward Taiwan, in Xinjiang, and throughout its periphery. Yet this is the narrative Chen promotes while privately committing to never making "unprofitable speeches about China."
She explicitly frames her mission in terms of discourse power competition:
"'Expanding China's Discourse Power:
From 'loudly issuing great wealth' to leading global discourse
This time history has given me a deeper awareness that although China's economic strength has long been prominent, discourse power in international public opinion is still far from sufficient.
In the long run, Chinese people have been accustomed to 'loudly issuing great wealth'. In wealth accumulation, we have achieved huge success, but in international public opinion, political power, cultural communication and other fields, Chinese discourse power is still not sufficiently influential.
Compared to the following, many people in global politics, finance, academia, and media key leadership domains still have deep influence, and they not only control wealth, but more occupy the dominant position in the global discourse system. We Chinese people can learn from many people, building a global cross-border influence force.
Chinese people need to improve strategy, not only need wealth, but more need discourse power."
This frames her activities within official CCP strategic objectives regarding international discourse power, a major focus of Xi Jinping's external propaganda directives. Her involvement in U.S. electoral politics can be understood as extending this mission from academic to political spheres—seeking to influence not just policy discussions but actual electoral outcomes and governance.
From Academia to Electoral Politics: The Trajectory of Influence
Chen's progression from academic influence operations to direct involvement in U.S. electoral politics represents a natural evolution of her documented mission. Her stated objectives—expanding Chinese discourse power and building cross-border influence networks—are equally applicable in political contexts as in academic ones.
The skills she honed in academic settings translate directly to political campaigns:
Intelligence gathering on targets becomes opposition research and stakeholder analysis
Cultivation protocols for professors become relationship building with donors and activists
Platform access demands at conferences become policy influence within campaign structures
Network building with policy experts becomes access to political decision-makers
Dual messaging capabilities become political communication strategies
Her involvement in the Sliwa campaign provides several potential avenues for advancing her documented objectives:
Information Access: Campaign involvement could provide access to internal campaign strategy, donor networks, Republican Party structures, and policy development processes—all valuable intelligence for understanding U.S. political dynamics.
Network Expansion: Political campaigns connect activists, donors, party officials, and policy advisors—exactly the type of influence networks Chen has explicitly stated she aims to build.
Legitimacy Building: Campaign involvement provides American political credentials that could support her stated long-term ambitions while creating appearance of mainstream political engagement rather than foreign influence operations.
Narrative Influence: Campaigns develop and promote policy positions. Someone operating under principles to never make "unprofitable" statements about China and always promote CCP achievements could potentially influence campaign messaging on China-related issues.
Long-term Positioning: If the campaign were successful, involvement could lead to positions in city government, providing a platform for continued influence operations and advancement toward her stated national-level political ambitions.
Evidence Assessment: Readership and Impact
Chen's WeChat articles include engagement metrics that demonstrate reach:
"Pro-Palestine student captured" article: 611 people starred
"Japan should side with China" article: 453 people starred
"Johns Hopkins University China Summit" article: 8 people starred
"Chinese female student uses social warfare strategy" article: 78 people starred
These numbers indicate her activities are being monitored and appreciated by a Chinese-language audience, likely including individuals connected to influence work networks. The fact that she publishes such operationally sensitive material suggests the documentation itself serves a purpose—whether demonstrating results to sponsors, building credibility within influence networks, or creating training materials.
Her transition to electoral politics involvement has not been documented on her WeChat account (at least not in the materials provided), which could indicate either operational security improvement or that such documentation may exist but was not included in the provided materials.
Operational Security Failures or Deliberate Documentation?
The extensive detail Chen provides about her influence operations represents either catastrophic operational security failure or, more likely, deliberate documentation that serves additional purposes beyond personal journaling.
Possible explanations for her transparency include:
Accountability to sponsors: Demonstrating results to Chinese institutions that compensate her work
Credibility building: Establishing reputation within CCP influence work networks
Recruitment and training: Creating case study materials for others conducting similar operations
Confidence in immunity: Belief that her status as student protects her from consequences
Cultural context: Chinese social media culture of detailed personal documentation without full appreciation of counterintelligence implications
Strategic signaling: Demonstrating capabilities to potential handlers or sponsors for advancement opportunities
Her apparent reduction in documentation (or at least public documentation) coinciding with her move into explicit political activity could suggest learning from previous operational security weaknesses, or simply that such documentation exists but has not been provided.
United Front Work Department Indicators
Chen's documented activities align with multiple characteristics of United Front Work Department operations:
Terminology and Framing
Uses "battlefield" (战场) to describe academic conferences and potentially political activities
Employs "social warfare strategy" (社交战术) terminology
References "expanding China's discourse power" (扩大中国话语权)—official CCP strategic objective
Describes "building cross-border influence networks" (构建全球跨境影响力网络)
Uses "comrades" (同志) in describing future collaborators
Operational Characteristics
Systematic intelligence gathering on targets before engagement
Phased cultivation protocols with documented timelines
Dual messaging where public statements differ from internal objectives
Financial compensation from Chinese institutions while operating in U.S.
Focus on cultivating academics, policy experts, government officials, and now political figures
Strategic positioning at conferences, institutional events, and now political campaigns
Strategic Objectives
Maximizing Chinese voices in policy discussions and potentially political processes
Countering negative narratives about CCP
Building networks that can influence U.S. policy debates and political outcomes
Long-term positioning within U.S. institutions including explicit goal of national security leadership
Deception and Manipulation
Presents as advocate for diversity while advancing single perspective
Retry
Claims to support balanced dialogue while committed to never making "unprofitable" statements about China
Uses academic and now political legitimacy as cover for influence operations
Exploits institutional values of openness, inclusion, and political participation
Employs calculated appearance and presentation to manipulate perception
Maintains different public and private positions on objectives
Progression Pattern
The evolution from academic to political engagement follows classic influence operation progression:
Phase 1: Establish presence and legitimacy (student status, academic credentials)
Phase 2: Build networks and gain platform access (conference participation, institutional penetration)
Phase 3: Transition to direct political engagement (campaign involvement, party membership)
Phase 4: Long-term positioning for positions of influence (stated ambitions for national security leadership)
This progression is consistent with long-term United Front work strategies that prioritize patient relationship building and gradual advancement into positions of influence rather than immediate results.
The Sliwa Campaign Context: Risks and Implications
Chen's involvement in Curtis Sliwa's mayoral campaign creates multiple categories of risk and concern:
Counterintelligence Risks
Information Compromise: Campaign involvement typically provides access to internal strategy discussions, opposition research, donor information, volunteer networks, and communication plans. An individual operating under principles that prohibit "unprofitable speeches about China" and who maintains financial ties to Chinese institutions poses obvious information security risks.
Network Penetration: Political campaigns serve as networking hubs connecting activists, donors, party officials, elected representatives, and policy advisors. Chen's documented cultivation skills could enable systematic penetration of these networks for influence or intelligence purposes.
Data Access: Modern campaigns maintain extensive databases of supporters, donors, voters, and volunteers. Depending on her role, Chen could potentially access sensitive political data that could inform Chinese understanding of American political dynamics or specific communities.
Policy Influence Risks
China Policy Positions: If Chen has any input into campaign policy development, her stated principles create obvious conflicts. Can someone committed to always presenting CCP achievements positively provide honest counsel on U.S.-China policy? Would she advocate positions that serve American interests or Chinese strategic objectives?
Narrative Shaping: Campaigns develop messaging on numerous issues. Chen's documented dual-messaging capabilities and strategic communication skills could be employed to shape campaign narratives in ways that advance her stated objectives while appearing to serve campaign interests.
Opposition Framing: Her documented willingness to attack U.S. government actions (such as characterizing ICE enforcement as "political purge") raises questions about how she might frame political opponents or policy debates within campaign contexts.
Long-term Strategic Risks
Credentialing: Successful campaign involvement provides American political credentials that support her stated long-term ambitions. Even if the campaign is unsuccessful, the experience builds her resume and legitimacy for future political positioning.
Party Structure Access: Her stated joining of the Republican Party combined with campaign involvement could provide entry points into party structures, committees, and networks that extend well beyond a single campaign.
Model Replication: If Chen's progression from academic to political influence is successful, it could serve as a model for others conducting similar operations, potentially leading to broader efforts to position CCP-aligned individuals within American political structures.
Legal and Ethical Concerns
FARA Compliance: Chen's financial relationships with Chinese institutions combined with her influence activities may constitute acting as an agent of a foreign principal. Campaign involvement while maintaining these relationships raises serious questions about Foreign Agent Registration Act compliance.
Campaign Finance: Are her Chinese institutional relationships and financial compensation properly disclosed to campaign finance authorities? Could there be any direct or indirect flow of resources from Chinese sources to campaign activities?
Voter Deception: Voters and campaign supporters presumably believe they are supporting American political representation. Are they aware that someone involved in the campaign operates under explicitly stated principles that prohibit statements detrimental to China and the CCP?
Security Clearance Issues: Her stated ambition to become Secretary of Defense would require highest-level security clearances. Her documented activities, statements, and financial relationships would presumably disqualify her from such clearances—yet she continues to position herself for political advancement.
Conclusion: From Academic Battlefield to Political Campaign
Xinlin Chen's progression from documented influence operations in elite academic institutions to active involvement in American electoral politics represents a case study in how foreign influence operations can evolve and escalate. Her own extensive published accounts provide extraordinary transparency into objectives, methods, and progression that are typically hidden from view.
The Core Facts Are Undisputed:
Chen has published detailed accounts documenting that she:
Operates under explicit principles to never make "unprofitable speeches about China" and always promote CCP achievements
Has articulated mission to "expand China's international discourse power" and "build global cross-border influence networks"
Frames her activities using CCP United Front Work Department terminology, describing academic conferences as "battlefields"
Has praised one-party dictatorship as "profitable and efficient" and denied CCP ethnic cleansing
Receives compensation from multiple Chinese institutions for political research while conducting influence activities in U.S.
Uses sophisticated cultivation protocols, dual messaging, and strategic deception
Has successfully penetrated elite academic institutions and built networks with professors, policy experts, and officials
States ambitions to become U.S. Secretary of Defense while maintaining all above commitments
Has recently joined Republican Party and become involved in U.S. political campaign
The Pattern Is Clear:
Her documented trajectory shows systematic progression from:
Student status establishing legitimacy
Academic engagement building credentials and networks
Institutional penetration gaining platform access
Network cultivation connecting with influential figures
Political engagement translating academic foundation into direct political involvement
Long-term positioning toward ultimate goals of national security leadership
The Concerns Are Serious:
An individual with her documented profile now works on an American political campaign, raising questions about:
Information security regarding campaign strategy and data
Policy influence given her stated principles prohibiting honest discourse about China
Network effects as her political connections expand
Legal compliance regarding FARA and campaign finance
Long-term risks of her explicitly stated ambitions
Broader pattern if she represents replicable model rather than unique case
The Response Should Be Measured:
Appropriate response requires balancing multiple considerations:
Public interest in transparency about foreign influence operations
Individual rights to privacy, due process, and fair treatment
Legitimate concerns about discrimination and xenophobia
Institutional vulnerabilities that enable such operations
Systemic reforms needed to better detect and respond to influence operations
Democratic values of openness and participation
National security requirements for protecting against foreign influence
The Implications Extend Beyond Individual Case:
Chen's documented activities reveal:
How effectively influence operations can exploit American institutional openness
How academic credentials and networks can launch political engagement
How legitimate values of diversity and inclusion can be weaponized
How long-term patient strategies can position individuals for advancement
How financial relationships with foreign institutions can coexist with U.S. activities
How extensively such operations can be documented without triggering institutional responses
How vulnerable American political campaigns may be to sophisticated influence operations
The Questions Demand Answers:
This case raises urgent questions requiring attention:
Are campaign officials aware of Chen's documented background, statements, and activities?
Has she disclosed her financial relationships with Chinese institutions to campaign?
What access does she have to sensitive campaign information, strategy, or networks?
Are other individuals following similar trajectories from academic to political engagement?
What vetting procedures do campaigns use for volunteers and staff with foreign connections?
How can institutions better detect and respond to sophisticated influence operations?
What legal authorities and policy frameworks are needed to address such activities?
The Stakes Are High:
At immediate level, this case concerns one individual's involvement in one municipal campaign. At strategic level, it concerns whether American democratic institutions—from universities to political campaigns to government agencies—can adequately defend against sophisticated foreign influence operations that exploit institutional openness, democratic values, and long-term patient strategies.
Chen's own words provide the evidence. She has told us explicitly what she is doing, why she is doing it, and how she is doing it. She has documented her mission to expand Chinese discourse power, her principles that prohibit honest discourse about China, her praise for authoritarian rule, her denial of regime abuses, her sophisticated cultivation methods, her successful institutional penetration, and her ambitions for American political leadership.
The question is not whether this information exists—it is extensively documented in her own published accounts. The question is whether American institutions will take seriously what she has so clearly revealed, and whether appropriate responses will be implemented to address both this specific case and the broader vulnerabilities it exposes.
Her involvement in the Sliwa campaign, coming after years of documented influence operations in academic settings, represents either the final evolution of her strategy or merely the next phase in a longer trajectory toward her stated ultimate objectives. Either way, it demands serious attention from campaign officials, party leaders, counterintelligence professionals, policymakers, and the American public.
The transparency Chen herself has provided through her extensive documentation offers a rare opportunity to understand and respond to influence operations that typically remain hidden until far too late. That opportunity should not be wasted.