【EXLUSIVE】A Secret Recording Reveals How the CCP Recruits Overseas Influencers

A recently released audio recording has provided one of the clearest, most detailed looks to date at how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) conducts its contemporary overseas influence operations. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rV7JFmz6Ca0

The recording was published by a Chinese-language YouTuber with roughly 350,000 subscribers in the military-affairs space. It captures a conversation with an individual presenting himself as a CCP-linked recruiter, outlining both the financial terms and the operational rules governing cooperation with overseas content creators.

What emerges from the audio is not traditional propaganda, but a highly calibrated, market-driven influence system—one that prizes credibility, ambiguity, and long-term narrative drift over overt messaging.

I. The €40,000 Model: Terms of Cooperation

According to the recording, the standard compensation offered to selected overseas creators is €40,000 per month, with approximately 30 percent retained by the intermediary recruiter.

In exchange, creators are expected to meet a set of behavioral and narrative conditions that define what Beijing now considers effective “external propaganda.”

Based on the recording and subsequent online analysis, the core features of this model can be summarized as follows:

1. “Small criticism, big assistance”

   Limited criticism of the CCP is permitted to maintain credibility, but the overall narrative must ultimately serve Beijing’s interests.

2. Absolute red line: no criticism of Xi Jinping

   Policy-level complaints may be tolerated; direct criticism of Xi Jinping is not.

3. Branding as “rational, objective, and neutral”

   Creators are encouraged to present themselves as calm, analytical, and above ideology—positioning their content as corrective to “emotional” or “extreme” discourse.

4. Consistent pessimism toward Taiwan

   Content should emphasize Taiwan’s vulnerability, decline, or lack of strategic agency and ability to defend, often framed as “realistic assessment.”

5. Promotion of “traditional Chinese culture”

   Cultural content functions as a soft-entry vehicle, lowering audience defenses while reinforcing civilizational narratives aligned with the Party-state.

6. Mid-tier reach, not top-tier fame

   Ideal candidates have tens or hundreds of thousands of subscribers—large enough to matter, small enough to avoid scrutiny.

II. Who the Party Avoids—and Why

The recording makes clear that the CCP deliberately avoids high-profile dissident figures. Influencers who are already widely known for overt anti-CCP activism are considered:

• too visible

• too politically labeled

• too risky to manage

• too costly in reputational exposure

The Party does not seek confrontation.

It seeks quiet conduits.

Preferred targets exist in the sociological middle ground: creators embedded in everyday lifestyle, cultural, or “non-political” niches whose audiences trust them precisely because they appear detached from power.

III. Recruitment Over Ideology

The recruiter describes the talent pool in sociological rather than ideological terms:

• overseas food vloggers

• music influencers

• blue-collar or technical creators

• culturally bilingual diaspora figures

It is social penetration through trust networks.

The objective is not admiration of the CCP, but gradual recalibration of what feels “reasonable,” “extreme,” or “inevitable.”

IV. Methodology: Controlled Dissent and Long-Term Drift

The guiding operational principle is summed up by a familiar phrase: “润物细无声”—moistening everything like gentle rain.

This translates into strict discipline:

• no sudden changes in tone

• no overt coordination

• no one-off propaganda bursts

Minor dissent is not a flaw—it is a feature. Controlled criticism enhances credibility; excessive criticism terminates cooperation.

In the platform era, effective influence must be indistinguishable from independent thought.

V. Beyond Money: The Implicit Pressure Mechanism

While the €40,000 monthly payment is explicit, the recording also alludes—carefully—to an unspoken incentive: reduced harassment of family members inside China.

The recruiter frames this not as coercion, but as a structural reality—being “on the list” rather than outside it.

In practice, cooperation functions as an informal insurance premium, paid quietly, without contracts.

VI. The CCP Recruiter: Identity and Background

The individual presenting himself as the recruiter claims to live in Philadelphia, USA, with his wife and children.

He states that he previously worked for PLA Daily (解放军报) and the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau  (specifically its public opinion and intelligence unit).

Online investigators have since identified him as:

• Online alias: 落日海盗  ( X @bright_hawkins) He deleted it after exposed

• Real name: 金亮 Jin, Liang

• Possible birth year: 1981

• Education: Participated in the 2000 Beijing college entrance exam, reportedly receiving minority bonus points due to Manchu ethnicity

• Career timeline:

  
  

  • No later than 2009: employed by PLA Daily

  • 2016: appeared in military media productions such as “军事微播炉,” partially showing his face on camera

  • 2017: publicly stated he conducted “in-depth reporting with the Xinjiang Military District”

  • Possibly worked for Beijing TV (BTV) as well

  • Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau  (specifically its public opinion and intelligence unit

  • Photo:

  
  

  

  
  

He has also claimed, in public statements, to be a Christian and a believer in the principles of the U.S. Declaration of Independence. These claims are not independently verified, but cannot be ruled out as sincere. What the recording suggests is not ideological conviction, but financial and structural inducement—doing politically sensitive work for the Party-state under monetary pressure.

VII. Named Individuals and Verification Status

It is important to distinguish confirmed cooperation from speculation. Based on statements from the “external propaganda” side itself:

• Cooperation has been confirmed with Singaporean influencer  https://www.youtube.com/@xiaodaodalang (小岛大浪吹) and US influencer in China Jerry Kowal (郭杰瑞) https://www.youtube.com/@jerrykowal1007

  
  

No name mentioned in the recording have been independently verified.

This investigation is ongoing. Additional findings will be published as they become available.